



**STATE OF NEVADA  
PUBLIC RECORDS TASK FORCE**

**NOTICE OF PUBLIC MEETING AND AGENDA**

**Date and Time:** June 8, 2026, 9:00AM

**Location:** Clark County Commissioners Chambers  
500 S Grand Central Pkwy  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

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This meeting may be viewed on Zoom:

Join Zoom Meeting

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1

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**AGENDA**

**1. Call to Order / Roll Call**

- 2. Public Comment** Members of the public may comment in person, on the Zoom webinar, or in writing on any matter that is not specifically included on the agenda at this time. However, no action may be taken upon a matter

raised under this item of the agenda until the matter itself has been specifically included on an agenda as an item upon which action may be taken.

3. **Approval of April 27, 2026 Meeting Minutes**
4. **Review Draft Report Template** (for discussion and possible action)
5. **Presentation Addressing Transparency Entities' Considerations under AB 128, Section 7.2(a) and Possible Action to Incorporate Presentation, or Portions thereof, into the Task Force's Written Report under AB 128, Section 7.9** (for discussion and possible action)
  - **Glen Cook, Las Vegas Review Journal**
6. **Presentation Addressing Transparency Entities' Considerations under AB 128, Section 7.2(a) and Possible Action to Incorporate Presentation, or Portions thereof, into the Task Force's Written Report under AB 128, Section 7.9** (for discussion and possible action)
  - **Bob Conrad, This is Reno**
7. **Presentation Addressing Transparency Entities' Considerations under AB 128, Section 7.2(a) and Possible Action to Incorporate Presentation, or Portions thereof, into the Task Force's Written Report under AB 128, Section 7.9** (for discussion and possible action)
  - **Luke Busby, Nevada Attorney**
8. **Presentation Addressing Transparency Entities' Considerations under AB 128, Section 7.2(a) and Possible Action to Incorporate Presentation, or Portions thereof, into the Task Force's Written Report under AB 128, Section 7.9** (for discussion and possible action)
  - **Dr. Sondra Cosgrove, Vote Nevada and Dave Maass, Electronic Frontier Foundation**
9. **Presentation under AB 128, Section 7.2(a) Regarding the Nature of Government Transparency, Records Involving Pending Prosecution Cases, and Records Involving Private (Non-Government) Individuals, Including but not Limited to Victims of Crime, and Possible Action to Incorporate Presentation, or Portions thereof, into the Task Force's**

**Written Report under AB 128, Section 7.9** (for discussion and possible action)

- **Lindsay Liddell, Washoe County District Attorney's Office**

**10. Evaluations and Recommendations Under AB 128, Section 7.2(a-b)** (for discussion and possible action)

**11. Consideration of Presentation Request by the Joint Interim Standing Committee on Government Affairs at the July 9, 2026 Meeting** (for discussion and possible action)

**12. Consideration of Topics and Next Meeting Dates and Related Issues** (for discussion and possible action)

**13. Public Comment** Members of the public may comment in person, on the Zoom webinar, or in writing on any matter that is not specifically included on the agenda at this time. However, no action may be taken upon a matter raised under this item of the agenda until the matter itself has been specifically included on an agenda as an item upon which action may be taken.

**14. Adjournment** (for possible action)

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Please Note: (1) Items on the agenda may be taken out of order; (2) The Public Records Task Force may combine two or more agenda items for consideration; and (3) The Public Records Task Force may delay or remove an item from the agenda at any time.

The Public Records Task Force will limit public comments to three minutes per speaker and may place other reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of public comments but will not restrict comments based upon viewpoint.

A person may submit comments to be attached to the minutes of the meeting, in writing, one business day before the meeting date, in addition to testifying in person, or in lieu of testifying in person. Written comments are limited to two pages. Written comments may be submitted electronically by email at [AGGeneralCounsel@ag.nv.gov](mailto:AGGeneralCounsel@ag.nv.gov).

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Meeting agendas and materials are available for download at the Public Records Task Force meeting page of the Attorney General's website: [https://ag.nv.gov/Hot\\_Topics/Public\\_Records\\_Task\\_Force/](https://ag.nv.gov/Hot_Topics/Public_Records_Task_Force/). Anyone desiring the agenda or supporting materials regarding any Public Records Task Force meeting is invited to call or email Yoon (Eunice) Lee at (702) 486-5717 or [AGGeneralCounsel@ag.nv.gov](mailto:AGGeneralCounsel@ag.nv.gov). Material may also be requested at 1 State of Nevada Way, Suite 100, Las Vegas, Nevada 89119.

The Public Records Task Force is pleased to make reasonable accommodations for members of the public who have disabilities and wish to attend the meeting. If accommodations for the meeting are needed, please notify Matt Christian at (702) 828-3310 or by email at [m16091c@lvmpd.com](mailto:m16091c@lvmpd.com), as soon as possible, and at least two days in advance of the meeting.

**Notice of Public Meeting and Agenda Posted at the Following Locations:**

1. Office of the Attorney General, 1 State of Nevada Way, Suite 100, Las Vegas, Nevada 89119
2. Internet: <https://notice.nv.gov>
3. Clark County Commissioners Chambers 500 S Grand Central Pkwy, Las Vegas, NV 89155

**From:** [Jared M. Frost](#)  
**To:** [Leslie M. Nino Piro](#)  
**Subject:** FW: Input for Public Records Task Force  
**Date:** Tuesday, June 2, 2026 4:28:37 PM  
**Attachments:** [image001.png](#)  
[image002.png](#)  
[image003.png](#)  
[image004.png](#)  
[image005.png](#)

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Hi Leslie here is some initial DMV feedback regarding the Public Records Task Force.

Jared M. Frost  
Senior Deputy Attorney General  
Transportation Division - DMV/DPS  
702-486-3177  
jfrost@ag.nv.gov

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**From:** Josh Parker <JWParker@dmv.nv.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 2, 2026 12:30 PM  
**To:** Jared M. Frost <JFrost@ag.nv.gov>; Hailey Foster <HFoster@dmv.nv.gov>; Amanda Manzo <AManzo@dmv.nv.gov>  
**Cc:** Angela Smith <ASmith@dmv.nv.gov>; Tonya Laney <TLaney@dmv.nv.gov>; Brittany Messer <BMesser@dmv.nv.gov>; Margie White <MRWhite@dmv.nv.gov>; Roseann Smith <RoseannSmith@dmv.nv.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Input for Public Records Task Force

Hi Jared,

Thank you for your message. This is both interesting and exciting.

It seems apparent that agencies struggle with volume, complexity, and inconsistency in processing requests. Clearer statutory definitions and pathways for resolving disputes would likely drastically reduce conflict and litigation.

I've captured the following via copilot from what you shared and can identify with each.

Here are the **Top 5 Recommended Reforms** based strictly on the three documents you provided:

**1. Clarify and modernize statutory definitions and exemptions**

- Define "public record" more precisely.
- Provide clearer authority for redaction and withholding when privacy, safety, or victim protections apply.

**2. Standardize statewide processes, fees, and timelines**

- Create uniform cost-recovery rules, fee caps, and timeline expectations across all jurisdictions.

- Reduce current inconsistencies and confusion.
- 3. Implement structured mechanisms for handling overbroad or vexatious requests**
  - Allow documented refinement and scoping phases.
  - Establish reviewable controls for repetitive or harassing request patterns, with appeal rights.
- 4. Create a dispute-resolution pathway short of litigation**
  - Provide a fast, affordable, administrative way to resolve disagreements between agencies and requesters.
- 5. Address modern data risks, including AI-enabled exploitation and commercial bulk extraction**
  - Consider differentiated fees for commercial requesters.
  - Limit redisclosure of sensitive fields.
  - Recognize AI-driven reidentification, doxing, and data-harvesting risks.

It is reassuring to know there is a structured body discussing and strategizing around these statewide issues. Thank you for the opportunity and transparency.



**JOSH PARKER** | Chief Data Officer  
**Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles**  
555 Wright Way, Carson City, NV 89711  
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Email: [jwparker@dmv.nv.gov](mailto:jwparker@dmv.nv.gov)



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**From:** Jared M. Frost <[JFrost@ag.nv.gov](mailto:JFrost@ag.nv.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, June 1, 2026 8:36 AM  
**To:** Josh Parker <[JWParker@dmv.nv.gov](mailto:JWParker@dmv.nv.gov)>; Hailey Foster <[HFoster@dmv.nv.gov](mailto:HFoster@dmv.nv.gov)>; Amanda Manzo <[AManzo@dmv.nv.gov](mailto:AManzo@dmv.nv.gov)>  
**Cc:** Angela Smith <[ASmith@dmv.nv.gov](mailto:ASmith@dmv.nv.gov)>; Tonya Laney <[TLaney@dmv.nv.gov](mailto:TLaney@dmv.nv.gov)>  
**Subject:** Input for Public Records Task Force

Hello DMV records team,

The OAG's general counsel has requested agency input for upcoming Public Records Task Force meetings on changes you would like to see in the NPRA. The attached materials from a meeting in April outline issues other government entities have flagged for discussion. I've also attached minutes from the first meeting in February

that includes more information about the composition of the group. Thanks and let me know if you have comments you would like me to pass along.

Kind regards,

Jared M. Frost  
Senior Deputy Attorney General  
Transportation Division - DMV/DPS  
702-486-3177  
[jfrost@ag.nv.gov](mailto:jfrost@ag.nv.gov)

**From:** [Oscar](#)  
**To:** [AGGeneralCounsel](#); [Yoon C. Lee](#); [Work, Kalie M](#)  
**Subject:** My concerns about protecting PII for the Public Records Task Force  
**Date:** Tuesday, June 2, 2026 3:15:51 PM  
**Attachments:** [Complaint to McDonald--PII Violation 1-8-26.docx](#)

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WARNING - This email originated from outside the State of Nevada. Exercise caution when opening attachments or clicking links, especially from unknown senders.

Hello. I'm excited by the agenda for the June 8th meeting. The issue of PII in elections is one I am concerned about. I've written to the Washoe ROV Andrew McDonald about my concerns and have attached that document to this message for your edification and discussion on certain federal laws, regulations, and guidance on the issue.

Please take a look.

Contact me if you have any questions or concerns.

Thank you for your interest and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Oscar Williams  
1540 Whisper Rock Way  
Reno, NV 89523  
C: 775-240-3456

**COMPLAINT AGAINST WASHOE COUNTY'S BALLOT RETURN ENVELOPES AND  
REGISTRATION POSTCARDS**

FROM: Oscar Williams  
1540 Whisper Rock Way  
Reno, NV 89523  
Email: oscar@oscardeywilliams.com

TO: Andrew McDonald  
1001 E. Ninth St.  
Reno, NV 89512

CC: Dep. Secretary of State Mark Wlaschin

DATE: January 8, 2026

**Subject: Lack of Voter Privacy/Protection, Aiding & Abetting ID Theft and Forgery**

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## **I. Introduction**

Too much of a voter's Personally Identifiable Information (PII) goes unprotected in Washoe County, putting voters at risk of identity theft and forgery in violation of voter and consumer rights, federal laws, and state laws.

A handwritten signature is a biometric identifier and a universally recognized authentication factor for legal, financial, medical, and governmental transactions, including voter registration and voting.

Washoe County previously concealed voter signatures with a privacy flap on the return envelope, but the county discontinued those protections in 2024. [Exh. Images of ballot return envelopes] Change of Address and Voter Verification postcards expose signatures as well. [Exh. Images of postcards]

This complaint respectfully requests you revert to the 2022 envelope design that has an opaque privacy flap covering the signature. There is no impediment to this design change now.

This complaint also requests implementation of federally required privacy/security notices and opt-out of data sharing with third parties on election materials.

The impact that Washoe County’s election system has on a voter’s privacy is not assessed by the Secretary of State. A voter’s PII wafts in the wind, so to speak, as a result.

The issue is not merely one of elections for identity theft and forgery go a long way, accelerated by the advent of Artificial Intelligence and high-resolution cameras on cell phones.

According to a report at TechSpot by Skye Jacobs (<https://www.techspot.com/news/108250-cybercriminals-using-ai-enroll-ghost-students-steal-financial.html>), stating:

“Cybercriminals are using AI-driven bots to impersonate students, enroll in online college courses, and divert financial aid, leaving real individuals with stolen identities and fraudulent debt.”

The stakes are high. In 2022, the total of victim losses due to identity theft in Nevada amounted to \$127,315,394, according to the FBI’s 2022 Internet Crime Report, page 26. ([https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2022\\_IC3Report.pdf](https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2022_IC3Report.pdf))

This complaint intends to safeguard against identity theft and forgery in pursuit of the purity of elections for all Nevadans.

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## **II. Complaint Points**

### **A. Washoe County’s Lapses in Protection of PII**

Washoe County protects the secrecy of *how* one votes but not the voter’s Personally Identifiable Information (PII) required to accept and record their votes or verify/update their registration.

1. Numerous Nevada laws provide for privacy in voting and ballot secrecy (see IV. State Standards below), but there are lapses in the protection of PII as follows:

When signed and returned, Washoe County’s ballot envelopes, Change of Address, and Voter Verification postcards publicly display:

- handwritten signature
- full name
- residential address
- precinct information
- Voter ID number and other registration identifiers
- ballot barcodes tied to a voter’s record

Individuals with access to the above information may include:

- household members
- coworkers
- USPS personnel

- ballot harvesters
- election staff and trainees
- temporary election workers
- volunteers
- vendor representatives
- ballot storage handlers
- observers

It's ironic that Washoe's signature-verification system in elections relies on a handwritten biometric identifier that you have chosen not to protect — even while mandating ballot secrecy.

2. Nevada's primary data-protection statute, NRS 603A.040, applies to private businesses ("data collectors") and the Secretary of State. It defines limited categories of protected information:

- SSNs
- Driver's license/ID numbers
- Financial account numbers
- Medical IDs
- Email + password combinations

The Gap: NRS 603A.040 does NOT protect:

- handwritten signatures
- handwritten signatures in conjunction with name, address, etc.
- authentication-signature data

The disparity between the secrecy of *how* one votes and protection of a voter's PII is a central flaw in the design of Nevada's elections due to the state's lapses in providing necessary and expected consumer and voter protections.

## **B. Nevada and Washoe County's Lapses in Consumer Notifications and Opt-Out Options by Method of Voting**

Former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo once said:

“People showing up, people actually showing ID, is still the easiest system to assure total integrity.”

In-person voting assures total integrity, according to Cuomo. It is widely regarded as the safest, most secure way to verify voters and to cast and collect ballots.

The following screenshot of Nevada's official NVease.gov portal labels return-by-mail as:


"RETURN BY MAIL — Most Secure"



This notice is only visible online during an election when a covered voter, whose qualification to use the web portal is self-affirming, requests an electronic ballot (eBallot) and they are given choices as how to return their ballot.

Yet, all other forms of voting, including by mail or hand delivery and in-person, have no such security notice.

In the Secretary's posted Visual Guide to NVease.gov<sup>1</sup>, the security is different and no return by fax is shown:



This change in messaging and misinformation regarding the security of eBallots and no others is legally significant and relevant to federal inquiry because:

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/showpublisheddocument/16072/63879986966910000>

- Voters rely on the State's representation of security.
- Voters are not warned that universal mail balloting exposes their PII.
- The State provides no opt-out from sharing their PII with third parties.
- Voters are not told that in-person voting is the most secure.

Counting votes requires voter verification which relies on signatures and other PII. Nevada and Washoe County have differing systems to verify voters depending on eBallot, paper ballot, and in-person digitized ballot.

Nevada and Washoe County have inconsistent security messaging between the three forms of voting, with those voting by mail and in-person receiving no security notices.

Nevada and Washoe County have no privacy notices or third party opt-out options in elections in violation of consumer protection and anti-ID theft and forgery laws regarding risks to PII and ways to avoid them.

### **C. USPS Mail Imaging & Interstate Routing**

Mail is routinely scanned for metadata; general procedures derive from 39 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, and USPS operational directives.

The scanned return envelope images that capture a voter's PII and signature may be stored, accessed, or analyzed by personnel or contractors beyond Washoe County's control.

The security of the records and length of retention are not openly disclosed to the voter.

This uncontrolled exposure raises federal privacy implications.

Mail ballots are an interstate matter with Washoe County sending and receiving mail ballots to/from out-of-state and with mail being routed through Sacramento. Federal laws apply.

### **D. eBallots v. Others**

In Nevada, an eBallot (PDF format) can be obtained via NVease.gov<sup>2</sup> or the Clerk/ROV can email it. The PDF ballots are offered to active-duty members of the United States Armed Forces, their spouses and dependents, Nevada voters who are outside of the country (NRS Chapter 293D), tribal voters who live on a colony or reservation in Nevada (NRS 293.269952(1)(a)(2)), and Nevada residents claiming a disability without proof (NRS 293.269951(1)(a)(a); NAC 293.206).

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/elections/voters/uniformed-overseas-citizens/ease-overview>

Online electronic ballots encompass a competing method of voting to vote-by-mail and in-person voting and have a different set of issues regarding protection of a voter's PII. For example, a voter who uses NVease.gov self-affirms a digital image of their signature. Or, they can replace the signature on file. An imposter with the right credentials on a voter can gain access to the signature image by simply applying for an eBallot. Then they self-affirm and obtain a ballot. Or, forge a signature and upload it, then self-affirm, and obtain a ballot.

A cast eBallot may be saved and stored on digital media such as a voter's hard drive. No other form of voting allows a voter to receive a copy of their cast ballot.

Electronic ballots sent electronically are handled and processed internally, out of public view, whereas official mail ballots are sent through the postal service or delivered by hand to a drop box or county office and are processed at intake in a publicly observable way.

Inconsistent with official paper ballots, an electronic ballot returned by mail or fax is self-printed and does not require approved ballot stock nor an official ballot return envelope. The unofficial envelope does not have to be signed. Self-printed ballots require extra processing for extraction, verification, and duplication compared to official ballots and return envelopes, and in-person voting.

Out of the many contrasts and inequalities between eBallots and other forms of voting, the risks to a voter's PII are occurring in cyberspace as opposed to more traditional and tangible forms of voting.

NVease.gov used to label ballots returned by mail as "Most Secure". Now NVEase.gov recommends 'RETURN ONLINE NOW' as "Most Secure". Nevadans rely on those assertions. But in reality, in-person is the most secure and always has been. NVease.gov fails to inform voters of the superior security of in-person voting. But at least the NVease.gov voters get a notice where others do not.

## **E. Exploits of Unprotected PII**

The scope of the problem:

- Easy access to a voter's PII with binding signature significantly increases the risk of identity theft and forgery.
- Voter Assistants and mail handlers public and private have access to the cast ballot return envelope.
- Nevada mails ballots to all active voters, some out-of-state, and with Washoe County's mail going through Sacramento — magnifying systemic exposure.

- USPS imaging and data retention adds external exposure risk.
- Likely, most Nevada voters are unaware of the risks and potential damages from ID theft and forgery when casting mail ballot.

Associated risks potentially resulting in ID theft and financial loss include but are not limited to:

- photograph the signature and envelope
- scan or photocopy the signature and envelope
- sell or share the PII-signature image
- compliment personal data to that found and sold on the Dark Web
- use the signature and other information for identity theft
- AI has already led to identity theft, a tool so powerful the risks cannot be overstated

The ROV, with approval of the Secretary of State, has created a situation ripe for exploitation by persons with ill intent in spite of the problems and risks associated with not protecting PII. Voting-by-mail is a catalyst for identity theft and forgery, with implications that go far beyond elections.

#### **F. Secretary’s Failure to Uphold State and Federal Laws that Protect PII**

There is confusion as to who has authority over the design of ballot return envelopes. The following statutes indicate that the Secretary designs and approves ballot envelopes with privacy in mind:

NRS 293.269913(5). The Secretary of State shall prescribe: (a)  
The form of all envelopes in which mail ballots are sent to voters and return envelopes.

NRS 293D.200(3). The Secretary of State shall develop standardized absentee-voting materials, including, without limitation, privacy and transmission envelopes and their electronic equivalents. (emphasis added)

A signature on a return ballot envelope is required pursuant to NRS 293.269917(1)(c):

Affix his or her signature on the return envelope in the space provided for the signature.

Prior to the 2024 Primary, the ROV changed the envelope design to expose signatures without legislative approval or a public process. [Exh. Images of ballot return envelopes]

Former Washoe County Deputy DA Mary Kandaras explained to me in her email of 7-17-24:

The reason the signature block was moved to the outside of the envelope related to significant delays caused by the continual malfunction of the laser that cuts the envelope to expose the signature under the flap. It simply couldn't consistently cut large quantities of envelopes reliably.

Whether or not Ms. Kandaras' insight as to the failure of what was a new Model 72 RED with Rapid Extraction by Opex<sup>3</sup> is true, her statements go to the ROV's actions without legislative or public process, putting full responsibility for failure to protect a voter's PII onto Washoe County.

The ROV changed the 2024 envelope to expose the signature. They can just as easily revert back to the prior 2022 version or something akin to it that protects one's signature. There is no legislative impediment that I'm aware of.

If the Secretary ignored his statutory duty to design the ballot return envelope with privacy in mind, I will address that issue under separate cover.

If true, then it is all the more important that you follow the law even if the Secretary doesn't.

### **G. Erosion of public trust**

The lack of protection of PII creates an erosion of trust, while aiding and abetting foreseeable, preventable risks to identity theft and forgery. The lack of proper messaging keeps the public uninformed of the risks in a conscious act to mollify the electorate into thinking their PII is safe and protected when it is not.

Due to a lack of messaging by Washoe County, its voters may be ignorant to the risks associated with exposure of their PII and how that may affect them. If voters knew the risks, it could alter their choice of voting method.

Voters deserve accurate information from which they can make a choice on how to vote.

The Washoe County Registrar of Voters has the power to change the equation by reviewing policies related to a voter's PII and instituting proper notice and safeguards to protect PII, including a change in the ballot return envelope to hide signatures.

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<sup>3</sup> <https://washoe.cobblestone.software/public/ViewFile.aspx?fid=1873&cid=1438>

### **III. Elections Covered by Commerce and Consumer Laws**

Often referred to as suffrage or the franchise, voting and elections are transactional and contractual and are covered by state and federal commerce and consumer protection laws.

- Voters are taxpayers who foot the bill for elections.
- Voters are consumers of a service and a product when registering to vote and voting.
- Voters have a contract with the city/county and state.
- Cities have a contract with the county.
- Counties have contracts with the state.

A voter's use of the franchise is rights-based and supported by numerous U.S. Supreme Court rulings. In *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the high court ruled that elections are "preservative of all rights," emphasizing the importance of voting to protect one's various rights.

A U.S. citizen and county resident submits a completed voter registration form to the county. Once accepted, the voter is entitled to receive a ballot. NRS 293.485(1) Qualifications: "...who has registered in the manner provided in this chapter, is entitled to vote at that election." The ballot becomes the property of the voter while it is in their possession.

The voter then casts and returns their ballot and is entitled to a fair, secure, accurate, and timely recording of their votes by the county.

Statewide, voters are entitled to a "uniform, statewide standard of counting and recounting all votes..." Nev. Const. art. 2 § 1A(10); NRS 293.2546(10). Other state constitutional rights in art. 2 § 1A go to accuracy, safety, non-discrimination, spoiled ballot replacement, assistance and instruction, complaint resolution, and more.

City-County contracts are interlocal agreements where the city pays the county to conduct their elections for a fee.

County-State contracts relate to funding, ballots, voter registration systems, reporting of results, certifying results, cybersecurity, and the NASPO Purchasing Agreement, along with numerous statutory performance commitments.

### **IV. State Standards Protecting Signatures and Authentication Identifiers**

Nevada law contains a comprehensive body of statutory protections demonstrating clear legislative intent to safeguard voter privacy, ballot secrecy, and confidentiality of personal information associated with elections.

## **A. Privacy and independence in the act of voting**

NRS 293B.065 — Voting systems must secure voter privacy and independence.

## **B. Voter privileged to a secret ballot**

NRS 49.315 "Every person has a privilege to refuse to disclose the tenor of his or her vote at a political election conducted by secret ballot..."

NRS 293.2555 Extends the privilege to all circumstances, prohibiting compelled disclosure of how a voter cast their ballot in any context.

## **C. Secrecy of mail ballots, electronic equivalents**

NRS 293.269913(1)(c) — Ballots must include "an envelope or sleeve... to ensure its secrecy."

NRS 293.269935(2) — Clerks must ensure "each mail ballot is kept secret."

NRS 293.3606(4) — County clerks must ensure ballots are "kept secret."

NRS 293D.200(3) — Secretary shall develop privacy and transmission envelopes and their electronic equivalents.

## **D. Protection of personal information within election systems**

NRS 293.3086(2) — Ballot tracking must ensure secrecy and protect "the confidentiality and integrity of personal information contained therein."

NRS 293.5882(2) — Reinforces identical obligations for all statewide free-access systems.

NRS 602A.040 — Requires data collectors to protect personal data, including the Secretary.

## **V. Federal Standards Protecting Signatures and Authentication Identifiers**

Federal frameworks uniformly recognize handwritten signatures as sensitive identifiers requiring protection.

### **A. Federal PII frameworks**

- OMB Circular A-130 — requires minimizing exposure of biometric identifiers.
- NIST SP 800-122 — classifies signatures as sensitive PII with high misuse risk.
- NIST SP 800-63-3 — Digital Identity Guidelines (Biometric & Authentication Factor Security).

- DOJ/FBI identity-crime guidance — lists signatures as primary fraud vectors. (Referenced for general principles; not a single codified document.)
- 12 CFR 1016 Privacy of Consumer Financial Information: periodic privacy notice (1016.4), opt-out (1016.7)
- 21 CFR Part 11 Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures: agency obligations, definitions, controls for data security

## **B. Federal statutes implicated**

Several federal authorities are relevant:

- Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007; (f) — aiding & abetting ID theft and forgery
- 52 U.S.C. § 20511— criminal deprivation of a fair election process
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028 & 1028A — identity theft & aggravated identity theft
- 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) — aiding & abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, or procuring an offense
- 15 U.S.C. § 6801 — safeguarding nonpublic personal information
- 15 U.S.C. § 7001(b) — meaningful notice required when using authentication-related identifiers
- 5 U.S.C. § 552a — federal requirements for handling sensitive personal information (Privacy Act)
- 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3) — duty to warn

## **C. Pertinent federal case law**

- *Clapper v. Amnesty International*, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) — substantial future harm is sufficient injury.
- *Remijas v. Neiman Marcus*, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015) — exposure of identifiers creates actionable risk.
- *OPM Data Breach Litigation*, 928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019) — biometric identifiers demand heightened protection.

These authorities demonstrate that exposed signatures constitute a recognized federal privacy risk, particularly when combined with other identifiers.

## **VI. Requested Action**

I respectfully request that you:

1. Review your practices to protect Personally Identifiable Information (PII), including the exposing of handwritten signatures on ballot envelopes and other election mailers, to determine which rights and laws are being violated.
2. A) Change the ballot return envelope design to conceal signatures, similar to the 2022 envelope. B) Provide privacy for return of other election mailers.
3. Assess whether Nevada's "Most Secure" online representations, without warnings, or without invite to vote in-person based on what is most secure, complies with federal consumer and privacy protections.
4. Provide clear disclosures regarding identity theft and forgery risks associated with exposed PII on ballot envelopes and other election mailers.
5. Provide an opt-out option to sharing personal information with third parties.
6. Demand NVease.gov to give notice of the security of in-person voting or official vote-by-mail as an alternative to eBallots.
7. Demand a statewide Privacy Impact Assessment.

## **VII. Conclusion**

Thanks to Washoe County's policy of exposing signatures on election materials, identity theft and forgery are easier and more likely to occur.

With uncontrolled imaging by USPS, ballot harvesters, and anyone with a cell phone who has access to a voter's PII, the situation poses a serious risk of identity theft and forgery — risks that federal statutes aim to prevent.

Moreover, mailed election materials provide no notice of risk of identity theft and no option to opt-out of sharing PII with third parties either, irrespective of consumer and voter protections laws.

The economy of scanning an exposed signature does not outweigh the risks to a voter's PII from an exposed signature with name, address, and so on.

Please, accept this complaint and act accordingly to safeguard Washoe County voters and their PII, including me.

The information provided is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge.

Respectfully submitted,

Oscar Williams

**Exhibits:**

2-Images of 2020 General Envelope

2-Images of 2022 General Envelope

Image of 2024 Primary Envelope

Image of Change of Address postcard

Image of Voter Verification postcard

**From:** [WatchDogJeff](#)  
**To:** [AGGeneralCounsel](#)  
**Cc:** [Leslie M. Nino Piro](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Public Records Task Force  
**Date:** Friday, June 5, 2026 3:48:11 PM  
**Attachments:** [Public Comment Pub Doc Task Force 6 8 26.doc](#)  
[image002.png](#)

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**WARNING** - This email originated from outside the State of Nevada. Exercise caution when opening attachments or clicking links, especially from unknown senders.

Attached my Public Comment.

FYI: Essentially, other states use an Ombudsman that can render advisory decisions. Great idea that saves everyone time and money and improved satisfaction. The TF needs to research this. Maybe a University student or class?

I can tell you that the NV RED. HOA Ombudsman is an example in how NOT to do it.

Jeff Church  
[WatchDogJeff.com](#)

On Friday, June 5, 2026 at 02:33:33 PM PDT, AGGeneralCounsel <[aggeneralcounsel@ag.nv.gov](mailto:aggeneralcounsel@ag.nv.gov)> wrote:

Good afternoon,

Please see attached updated agenda and new materials for the upcoming Public Records Task Force meeting being held on Monday, June 8, 2026.

Thank you.

Sincerely,



State of Nevada  
Office of the Attorney General

Office of General Counsel

*Leslie M. Nino Piro*, General Counsel  
*Sophia G. Long*, Deputy General Counsel  
*Jeffrey W. Chronister*, Deputy General Counsel

Email: [AGGeneralCounsel@ag.nv.gov](mailto:AGGeneralCounsel@ag.nv.gov)

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**From:** AGGeneralCounsel <AGGeneralCounsel@ag.nv.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 2, 2026 1:51 PM  
**To:** AGGeneralCounsel <AGGeneralCounsel@ag.nv.gov>  
**Subject:** Public Records Task Force

Good morning,

Please see attached Agenda, meeting minutes and supporting materials for the upcoming Public Records Task Force meeting being held on Monday, June 8, 2026.

Thank you.

Sincerely,


**Yoon (Eunice) Lee**

Executive Assistant  
General Counsel Leslie M. Nino Piro  
Office of the Nevada Attorney General  
1 State of Nevada Way, Suite 100  
Las Vegas, NV 89119

☎ (702) 486-5717 (Direct)

📧 [y.lee@ag.nv.gov](mailto:y.lee@ag.nv.gov)



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## Public Document Task Force: Public Comment, 6-8-2026

First, the present system is not working. It is burdensome for local agencies and the only option for citizens is expensive litigation. That bogs down the courts and by the time the issue is decided, it is often moot.

The best option may be an ombudsperson or admin magistrate. As per below it is used in other states! Massive improvement in cost savings for all, time and satisfaction!

I'm open to ideas. Previously I considered the A.G. similar to OML but the A.G. is conflicted represented state agencies and the current A.G is approx. one full year ++ behind on decisions rendering them moot.

No one is looking out for the public's interest. I have not had time to look and see good models from other states. Another concern is the stock answer "There are no documents relevant to your request" making it a guessing game and back and forth when in essence the citizen is requesting an answer or has a question rather than wrapping the response in whether there exists a formal document consistent to the response.

Q: "When is the next XYZ meeting?"

A: There are no documents responsive to your request."

Recently I wanted to know if an employee was still employed and how much he made. They were not responsive but I then asked for his paystub (a document) and got it. Do it really have to be this cat and mouse game?

**It would seem that the best options may be a ombudsman provided it is done right to expedite the process. A similar idea is a statewide administrative magistrate or similar along the lines of small claims to quickly hear the issue without a lot of discovery and the losing party can always then file with the courts. Result: Greatly increased community and media satisfaction; massive cost savings to local government vs litigation; massive savings to the Courts by having a hearing officer or advocate that can render decisions and mediate.**

Has anyone done this research for you? If not why not?

I think it is essential that any ombudsman act quickly and be able to issue (advisory) opinions that could be appealed to the courts. So this is a tested option, nothing something outside the box or new.

## From AI on an ombudsman; Examples in the United States

The Public Access Ombudsman is a valuable resource for ensuring transparency and accountability in government. By providing mediation, guidance, and education, the office helps citizens exercise their right to access public records while assisting agencies in complying with state laws. This role is particularly useful for resolving disputes informally and promoting a culture of openness in government operations.

Maryland: The Office of the Public Access Ombudsman was established in 2016. The Ombudsman is appointed by the Attorney General and helps resolve disputes under the Maryland Public Information Act (PIA).

Maryland.gov.

Maine: The Maine Legislature created a Public Access Ombudsman to review complaints under the Freedom of Access Act, mediate disputes, provide educational materials, **and issue advisory opinions**. maine.gov

Oregon: <https://www.oregon.gov/pr/pra/Pages/default.aspx>

The Office of the Public Records Advocate was created pursuant to SB 106 during the 2017 legislative session. Under the law, which can be found in Oregon Revised Statutes Chapter 192, the Advocate is responsible for: providing dispute resolution services at the request of government bodies or public records requesters; providing training on public records laws and best practices; providing guidance and advice on the public records law upon request; and serving as a voting member, and executive director, of the Public Records Advisory Council.

Indiana: <https://www.in.gov/pac/> and <https://www.in.gov/pac/files/formal-complaint-form.pdf>

Sincerely,

*Watchdog Jeff*

Jeff Church  
RenoTaxRevolt.com  
775 544-RENO (7366)  
RenoTaxRevolt@Sbcglobal.net